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I. Introduction
In 2006, Christopher Norberg visited Dr. Beigel’s chiropractor
1
office in San Francisco. After the visit, Norberg posted a Yelp
review in which he stated that Dr. Biegel’s office employed dishonest
billing practices because they had billed him four times the quoted
2
amount. Dr. Biegel sued Norberg for defamation, claiming that the
Yelp review contained false statements of fact. Dr. Biegel alleged
that he discussed the additional fees with Norberg, and explained that
they were to compensate for additional time and effort the office
3
spent with insurers. Norberg insisted that his statements were
4
protected as opinion. Eventually, as a result of a court-mandated
mediation hearing, Norberg replaced the original post with the
following statement:
A misunderstanding between both parties led us to act out of
hand. I chose to ignore Dr. Biegel’s initial request to discuss
my posting. In hindsight, I should have remained open to his
concerns. Both Dr. Biegel and I strongly believe in a person’s
right to express their opinions in a public forum. We both
5
encourage the internet community to act responsibly.
Today, many consumers depend on online review sites to guide
their selection of restaurants, doctors, hairdressers, retail stores, and
other businesses. The opinions and experiences shared on these sites
have the potential to benefit both consumers and businesses;
consumers are able to make more informed decisions, and popular
businesses receive free marketing. However, false and dishonest
6
reviews can hurt both businesses and consumers.
The most common remedy for a false review is a defamation suit.
The threshold issue in a defamation suit is whether the complaining
party is a public figure or a private figure. Whereas public figures
must prove that a review was posted with actual malice (knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth), private figures have a lower

1. Elinor Mills, Lawsuit over Yelp Review Settled, CNET.COM, (Jan 9, 2009, 4:38
PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10139278-93.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Just as there is no societal value to false online reviews, the Supreme Court held
in Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974) that there is no constitutional value to false
statements of fact.
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7

burden of proof. The status of businesses as public or private figures
for the purposes of online reviews is unclear at this time. There are
three notable results of this uncertainty: (1) defamation actions are
less likely to be dismissed on the pleadings, (2) defamation cases
settle more frequently, and (3) protected speech is more likely to be
retracted. The goal of this Note is to propose a clearer distinction
between businesses that are public figures, and businesses that are
private figures, resulting in a test that balances the First Amendment
rights of online reviewers with the right of businesses to be protected
8
from defamation.
Part II of this Note will discuss existing remedies for false and
dishonest reviews, including the Communications Decency Act
9
10
(“CDA”), the mandatory disclosure of material connections, and
defamation law. Part III of this Note will discuss the public figure
doctrine. Part IV of this Note will discuss the public figure doctrine
as applied to businesses, and the problems and ambiguities that exist.
Finally, Part V of this Note will compare the consequences of treating
all businesses as public figures with the consequences of treating only
some businesses as public figures, and will propose a new test based
on the amount and type of online advertising in which a business
engages.

II. Current Remedies for False and Misleading Reviews
In outlining the current status of the law, this Note will first
11
discuss the prohibition of website liability under the CDA. Then,
this Note will discuss the FTC regulation that governs reviews posted
by businesses and their competitors, referred to here as the “Material
12
Connections” Rule. Finally, this Note will discuss the current state

7. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public figures must show
actual malice); cf. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (where the individual is a private
figure and the matter is of public concern, the figure must show negligence for
compensatory damages and actual malice for punitive damages); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (indicating that there is no First
Amendment right to make defamatory statements about a private figure involving a
matter that does not involve public concern).
8. See, e.g, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz v. Welch, 418
U.S. 323 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
Each of these cases balances First Amendment rights with the right to avoid defamation.
9. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006) (granting website hosts statutory immunity from liability
for content that they make available online but do not directly create).
10. 47 U.S.C. § 230
11. Id.
12. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (West 2010).
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of defamation jurisprudence as it applies to actions brought against
third party reviewers.
A. Communications Decency Act

Before discussing reviewer liability, it is helpful to explain the
laws governing website liability. The CDA distinguishes between two
different types of website operators: “information content providers,”
13
and “interactive computer services.” Information content providers,
such as online newspapers, are treated as the publisher or speaker of
14
the information contained on the site. Thus, they are held liable for
15
any defamatory statements. Interactive computer services, such as
online discussion sites, are not liable for content that they make
16
17
available, but do not create, such as content posted by users. This
remains true even if they perform “traditional editorial functions—
such as electing to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter the
18
content.”
The reason for this distinction is articulated in the findings and
19
policy goals found at the beginning of the CDA.
Interactive
computer services promote unique diversity of information and
20
opinion.
Furthermore, they have previously flourished in the
21
Thus, to encourage the
absence of government regulation.
22
continued development of interactive media, Congress made a
policy decision to avoid imposing tort liability “on companies that
serve as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious
23
messages.”

13. See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003).
14. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
15. Id.
16. See Elizabeth A. Ritvo, Jeffrey P. Hermes & Samantha L. Gerlovin, Online
Forums and Chat Rooms in Defamation Actions, 24 COMM. LAWYER, Summer 2006, at 1,
17 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230).
17. See, e.g., Novak v. Overture Services, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 452 (E.D.N.Y.
2004) (finding that Google was an “interactive computer service” and not a “information
content provider” for the purposes of failing to remove allegedly objectionable content
from its online discussion groups).
18. Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
19. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
20. Id. at (a)(3).
21. Id. at (a)(4).
22. Id. at (b)(1).
23. Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997).
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Inability to sue the website host as a result of the CDA can make
24
it difficult for defamation plaintiffs to track down online reviewers.
However, online review sites typically require reviewers to provide a
25
name and email address before posting to the message board.
Defamation plaintiffs can then subpoena this information about
26
particular reviewers at the onset of litigation.
This prevents
reviewer anonymity from precluding defamation actions.
B. The “Material Connections” Rule

Potentially false or dishonest business reviews can be separated
into three categories: affiliate reviews, competitor reviews, and third
party reviews. Affiliate reviews include, for example, those written
by a business owner, an employee, or someone paid by the business to
write a positive review. These reviews are likely to be falsely
27
positive.
Competitor reviews are those written by individuals
affiliated with competing businesses. These reviews are likely to be
28
falsely negative. Third party reviews are those written by a neutral
third party, such as a customer.
The FTC has addressed the first category (reviews by business
affiliates), and potentially the second category (reviews by
competitors), in its material connections rule. Pursuant to this
regulation, a reviewer in an online message board must “clearly and
conspicuously disclose her relationship” to the company she is
reviewing because it “likely would affect the weight or credibility” of
29
her review.
The regulation targets endorsements, defined as “any advertising
message . . . that consumers are likely to believe reflects the opinions,
beliefs, findings, or experiences of a party other than the sponsoring
30
advertiser.” Therefore, an employee who posts a positive review

24. Ritvo et al., supra note 16, at 1.
25. See John Wilson, Corporate Criticism on the Internet: The Fine Line Between
Anonymous Speech and Cybersmear, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 533, 544 (2002).
26. Id.
27. See Tobias J. Butler, The Realities of Relying on Doctor-Patient Non-Disclosure
Agreements for Reputational Protection, HEALTH LAWYER, June 2010, at 23, 27
(discussing four types of posts: (1) positive and accurate, (2) negative and accurate, (3)
positive and inaccurate, and (4) negative and inaccurate).
28. See id.
29. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5, Example 8 (West 2010) (providing that disclosure would be
required where, for example, an employee of a “leading playback device” manufacturer
advocates for that manufacturer’s product in an “online message board designated for
discussions of new music download technology”).
30. Id. at § 255.0.

408

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[34:3

about her employer’s product or service online would have to disclose
her employment status because her review constitutes an
31
endorsement. Conversely, a nonaffiliated third-party consumer who
writes a positive online review is not required to make any disclosures
32
because her review is not an endorsement.
Whether this regulation would require an affiliate of a competing
business to disclose her employment status is unclear. While it would
33
“materially affect the weight or credibility” of the review, it is
unclear whether this type of a review would constitute an
endorsement. On one hand, the term “endorsement” connotes a
34
positive review, and the examples listed all discuss positive reviews.
On the other, writing a negative review for a competitor could also be
construed as a type of positive advertisement, which would make
disclosure necessary. Regardless, even if competitor reviews were not
covered by this regulation, a business could still file a defamation
action. Although requiring disclosure of this relationship would be an
easier way to prevent competitor reviews from misleading consumers,
a business may find it easier to convince a jury that a review written
35
by a competitor was false, or written with actual malice.
While the First Amendment creates a presumption against
36
governmental regulation of speech, the Supreme Court has long
recognized that the government may regulate commercial speech
37
because it tends to be false or misleading. Although there is some
38
debate as to whether this particular regulation is overbroad, most
endorsements are likely to fall under the purview of commercial

31. Id. at § 255.5, Example 8.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. The 9 examples discussed: (1) advertisers who fund research that supports their
products; (2) a film star who endorses a food product; (3) a famous athlete who
unofficially endorses a product; (4) a physician who vouches for a product; (5)
spontaneous interviews of restaurant customers; (6) individuals compensated to provide a
consumer endorsement of a product; (7) a blogger known as a video game expert who
endorses a new game; (8) an employee participating in an online review board discussion
about his or her company’s products; (9) individuals compensated to advertise products on
the street. Id. at § 255.0, Examples 1–9.
35. As would be required if the business was a public figure.
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
37. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980) (“The Constitution therefore affords a lesser protection to commercial speech
than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression . . . . The government may ban forms
of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it” (citations omitted)).
38. See, e.g., Nicholas A. Ortiz, Consumer Speech and the Constitutional Limits of
FTC Regulations of “New Media,” 10 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 936 (2010).
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speech and thus do not pose the same constitutional questions as
third party consumer reviews, or other reviews that do not constitute
commercial speech.
C. Defamation Law

A defamation action is the private remedy for false or misleading
39
online reviews. To establish defamation, a business must show: (1) a
40
false and defamatory statement of fact concerning the business; (2)
41
unprivileged publication of that statement to a third party; (3) the
42
43
requisite degree of fault; and (4) harmful nature of the statement.
When a business brings a defamation action based on a negative
review, the second and fourth prongs are fairly simple to establish.
Posting a statement on the internet is “publication” within the
44
meaning of defamation law. Further, it is a matter of common sense
that negative reviews harm a business’ reputation. The ambiguities
arise in establishing the first and third prongs, as they invoke First
Amendment protections.

39. Although defamation is typically a matter of state tort law, the requisite elements
tend to be substantially similar from state to state. See, e.g., 5 WITKIN, SUMMARY TORTS
§ 529 (10th ed. 2005) (summarizing California defamation elements as “(a) a publication
that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency
to injure or that causes special damage.”); Id. at § 535 (describing “published” as
“communicated to some third person who understands its defamatory meaning and
application to the plaintiff”); Id. at §§ 602–607 (discussing varying degrees of fault); 14
N.Y. PRACTICE, NEW YORK LAW OF TORTS § 1:42 (2010) (listing the elements of
defamation as (1) a false an injurious statement of fact concerning the plaintiff, (2)
publication to a third party by the defendant, (3) depending on the status of the plaintiff
and defendant, made with malice, recklessness, gross negligence, or made negligently or
innocently, (4) special damages or presumed harm in per se actionable cases).
40. See, e.g., 5 WITKIN, SUMMARY TORTS § 529 (10th ed. 2005) (California law
requires a statement that is false and defamatory); 14 N.Y. PRACTICE, N. Y. LAW OF
TORTS § 1:42 (2010) (New York law requires a false and injurious statement of fact).
41. “Publication of defamatory matter is its communication intentionally or by a
negligent act to one other than other person defamed.” RESTATAMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 577 (1977).
42. The Restatement discusses fault under its discussion of publication, which it
defines as “communication intentionally or by a negligent act” to one other than other
person defamed. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 (1977) (emphasis added).
Discussion of the requisite degree of fault in online business reviews will be discussed infra
in Part II. C. 2. i. and ii.
43. Id. at § 558.
44. A statement posted on an online message board is “published” for the purposes
of defamation law. See Wilson, supra note 25, at 558 (citing Giorgio Bovenzi, Liability of
Systems Operators on the Internet, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 119 (1996)).
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Opinion Versus Fact

Whereas a speaker can be liable for false statements of fact, the
First Amendment protects statements of opinion. The Supreme
Court has stated that, “under the First Amendment there is no such
thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, one
depends for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries
but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional
45
value in false statements of fact.” Therefore, only those statements
that a reasonable person would interpret to state a fact can constitute
46
defamation.
The Restatement of Torts, which has incorporated First
Amendment jurisprudence into its guidelines, provides that a
statement may be actionable for defamation whenever a reasonable
47
person interprets it to state a defamatory fact, or to imply an
48
undisclosed defamatory fact as the basis for an opinion.
It is likely that many harmful statements made in online review
49
sites constitute mere opinion that is not actionable. Some review
sites post disclaimers to this effect, warning viewers that all of their
50
content is merely reviewer opinion. Since the opinion versus fact
distinction is based on a reasonable person, the existence of
disclaimers and the general tone of the message board can affect
51
whether a statement is considered defamatory. However, sometimes
the line between opinion and fact is difficult to draw.
Consider the following hypothetical reviews of a barber shop on
an online message board. One reviewer writes that he did not like the
haircut that he received, and thinks that the barber is unskilled. A
second reviewer writes that he saw the barber use the same comb on
two different customers, and notes that this is a health code violation.

45. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
46. See Milkovich v. Loraine Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990).
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 565 (1977).
48. See id. at § 566 (“A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the
form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the
allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.”).
49. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 25, at 567 (citing Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing
John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cybersbace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 919 (2000) (arguing
that, in large part, the online audience views Internet discourse as mere “rhetorical
hyperbole or subjective speculation rather than a sober recitation of actual facts”)).
50. Wilson, supra note 25, at 567 (for example, Yahoo financial message boards
contain the following disclaimer: “These messages are only the opinion of the poster, are
no substitute for your own research, and should not be relied upon for trading or any
other purpose.”).
51. See id. at 559.
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A third reviewer writes that the barber schedules too many
appointments at once, and that as a result he was rushed and received
a poor quality haircut.
The first review is clearly opinion, since it does not state or imply
any defamatory fact. The second review would probably be found to
state defamatory fact, since it accuses the barber of a specific action
that constitutes a health code violation. However, the third review is
more ambiguous. It accuses the barber of over-scheduling, which the
barber may consider to be a defamatory fact. However, how much
time is required for an appointment, what feels rushed, and how this
affects the quality of a haircut are all likely to be considered matters
of opinion that cannot be proven or disproven.
2.

Establishing Fault

The level of fault required to establish defamation depends on the
speaker and the nature of the statement. The Supreme Court has
found that the First Amendment affords extra protection to speech
52
about public figures and matters of public concern. Therefore, the
requisite degree of fault in a defamation action depends first on
53
whether the plaintiff is classified as a “public figure” or a “private
54
figure.” Whereas public figures and public officials must prove that
a review was made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of
55
the truth, private figures are held to a lesser standard (which varies
56
depending on the nature of the statement). The level of fault that a
business must show to establish defamation therefore depends on
whether the business is classified as a public or a private figure.

III. The Public Figure Doctrine
First Amendment jurisprudence imposes three potential fault
standards in defamation actions. For public figures, the standard is
actual malice, regardless of whether the speech involves a matter of
57
For private figures, there are three possible
public concern.
standards. Where the speech involves a private figure, and is about a
matter of public concern, the minimum standard is negligence for

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id.
See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
See New York Times, 376 U.S. 254.
See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. 323.
See New York Times, 376 U.S. 254.

412

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[34:3
58

compensatory damages, and actual malice for punitive damages.
However, where the speech is about a private figure and does not
involve a matter of public concern, First Amendment jurisprudence
59
imposes no restraints on state tort law standards. These standards
are indicated in the chart below.
Public Figure

Private Figure

60

Compensatory Damages- Negligence
61
Punitive Damages- Actual Malice

62

No First Amendment Constraints

Public
Concern

Actual Malice

No Public
Concern

Actual Malice

63

A. Distinguishing Between Public and Private Figures

The Supreme Court has identified three categories of public
64
figures. In differentiating between the three different types of public
figures and private figures, the two most relevant factors seem to be
65
the individual’s relationship to a public controversy, and that
66
individual’s access to the media or other channels of communication.
First, there are general purpose public figures, which “occupy
positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are
67
These figures are
deemed public figures for all purposes.”
“intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions
or, by reason of their fame, shape events of concern to society at
58. See Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 (Gertz provides that states must impose some degree of
fault, however, so strict liability is not an option).
59. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985).
60. See New York Times, 376 U.S. 254 .
61. See Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 .
62. See New York Times, 376 U.S. 254.
63. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. 749.
64. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring)
(note that while it is not the majority opinion in Curtis, Chief Justice Warren’s
concurrence is commonly cited as the emerging precedent. See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at
335.); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
65. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
66. Curtis, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
67. Curtis, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring) (note that while it is
not the majority opinion in Curtis, Chief Justice Warren’s concurrence is commonly cited
as the emerging precedent. See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 335.).
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large.” Because they are prominent but politically unaccountable,
society “has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of
69
such persons.”
Therefore, these individuals must accept public
scrutiny as a necessary consequence of their involvement in public
70
For example, in Hustler v. Falwell, Jerry Falwell, “a
affairs.
nationally known minister who ha[d] been active as a commentator
on politics and public affairs,” was a public figure for the purposes of
71
a parody published in Hustler magazine.
Next, there are limited-purpose public figures, which “thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order
72
to influence the resolution of the issues involved.”
By injecting
themselves into public debate, these public figures invite attention
73
and comment in a way that private individuals do not. For example,
in Associated Press v. Walker, the Court found that Walker, an
individual who had made his career opposing physical intervention by
federal marshals in political activity, was a public figure for the
74
purposes of an article about federal military intervention in a riot.
Finally, Gertz recognized the possibility that someone could
involuntarily become a public figure “through no purposeful action of
75
his own.” However, the Court cautioned that this type of public
figure must be “exceedingly rare,” and noted “for the most part,
those who attain this status have assumed roles of special prominence
76
in the affairs of society.” For example, the D.C. Circuit found an air
traffic controller who was on duty during a famous crash was an
involuntary public figure for the purposes of a news article covering
77
the crash. The United States Supreme Court has never recognized
an involuntary public figure.
Individuals who are not public figures are private figures. Private
figures have a lower burden because the Court has found a state’s
interest in protecting private individuals from defamatory speech

68. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 337.
69. Curtis, 388 U.S. at 163–64 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
70. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
71. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47 (1988).
72. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
73. Id.
74. 388 U.S. 130, 136 (1967) (note that Walker was decided with Curtis, and does not
have a separate citation).
75. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
76. Id.
77. Dameron v. Wash. Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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outweighs the First Amendment rights of the speaker. For example,
in Gertz v. Welch, a lawyer representing one party in a high-profile
police shooting case was not a public figure for the purpose of an
article falsely accusing him of being a “Lenninist” and a “Communist79
fronter,” among other things. The Court found that even though he
was “well known in some circles” as the result of his involvement in
“community and professional affairs,” he was a purely private figure
because he did not engage the public’s attention in an attempt to
80
influence the outcome of a particular issue.
In both Curtis and Gertz, the Court emphasized access to media
81
as the primary means for public figures to address criticism.
In
Curtis, the Court stated that, “as a class, these ‘public figures’ have as
ready access as ‘public officials’ to mass media of communication,
both to influence policy and to counter criticism of their own views
82
and activities.” Similarly, in Gertz, the Court found “public officials
and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the
channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic
opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals
83
normally enjoy.” Therefore, private individuals are more vulnerable
84
to injury, and “more deserving of recovery.”
However, media resulting from a tort cannot make the plaintiff a
85
public figure for the purposes of that tort. “Clearly, those charged
with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own
86
defense by making the claimant a public figure.” In Hutchinson, the
Court found that when a senator gave a mock award to a federally
funded researcher for demonstrating egregious and wasteful
government spending, the researcher was not a limited public figure
87
for the purpose of federal grants. The researcher had not invited the
necessary degree of “public attention and comment” on the issue, and
88
he had no “regular and continuing” access to the media.
Furthermore, the media and controversy resulting from the award

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Gertz, 418 U.S. 348.
Id. at 325–26.
Id. at 352.
Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343.
Curtis, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343.
Id.
See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 411, 431 (1979).
Id.
Id. at 417, 431.
Id. at 432.
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could not make the researcher a public figure for the purposes of that
89
award.
B. Public Versus Private Concern

In addition to considering whether the plaintiff is a public or a
private figure, the Court has considered whether there exists a matter
of public concern. However, the Supreme Court has recognized that
“the boundaries of speech on matters of public concern are not well
90
defined.” Speech is on a matter of public concern when it can “be
fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social or other
91
concern to the community,” or when it “is a subject of general
92
However, “a
interest and of value and concern to the public.”
statement’s arguably ‘inappropriate or controversial character . . . is
irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public
93
concern.’” The court looks to the content, form and context of the
speech to determine whether it is of a matter of public or private
94
95
concern. No one factor is dispositive.
Whereas public figure plaintiffs must prove actual malice
regardless of whether the speech in question is on a matter of public
96
concern, the standard for private figure plaintiffs varies depending
on whether the speech involves a matter of public concern. In Gertz
v. Welch, where the plaintiff was a private figure, and the speech
involved a matter of public concern, the Court held that actual malice
was required to recover punitive damages, and some degree of fault
(presumably negligence) was required to recover compensatory
97
However, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
damages.
Builders, Inc., where the plaintiff was a private figure and no matter
of public concern existed, the Court found that no showing of actual
98
malice was required for the recovery of punitive damages, and
implied that recovery for such speech was not constrained by the First
Amendment.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 431.
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1211 (2011).
Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)).
Id. (citing San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004)).
Id. (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U. S. 378, 387 (1987)).
Id. (citing Dun, 472 U.S. at 761).
Id.
See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. at 349.
472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985).
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IV. Application of the Public Figure Standard to Businesses
A. Three Case Studies
1.

Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co.

Bruno & Stillman, Inc. (“the corporation”) manufactures and
99
sells commercial fishing boats.
The Globe newspaper published
several articles reporting defects in the boats, and attributed the
100
The
sinking of two corporation-made boats to these defects.
corporation filed a defamation suit against the Globe, alleging both
101
negligent and intentional libel.
The district court found that corporations are public figures
because, first, they enjoy access to the channels of communication,
and second, they “voluntarily place before the public an issue of some
importance regarding the quality and integrity of their products,” and
“generally promote the sale of their products to the public by
102
engaging in some form of advertising.”
The First Circuit reversed, finding that not all corporations are
103
public figures for two reasons.
First, the court found that “to the
extent that access to the channels of communication is a meaningful
factor . . . corporations have no particular advantage over private
104
Second, the court found that a business does not
individuals.”
105
thrust itself into a public controversy by merely selling products.
The court gave three more relevant factors that courts should take
into consideration in determining whether a corporation is a public
figure: (1) whether the controversy that gave rise to the defamation is
public or private, (2) whether the controversy preexisted the
statements at issue, (3) the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s
106
participation in the controversy.
In applying these factors, the court refused to extend public figure
status to include all reasonably successful manufacturers, merchants,
107
The court found “no public controversy
and professionals.
surrounding the publication of the Globe articles” and contrasted the

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980).
Id. at 585.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 589.
Id.
Id. at 589–90.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 592
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situation with one where the public was actually discussing a matter.
The court then remanded to the district court to find whether a public
controversy implicating the company existed apart from the
challenged statements, and whether the “prominence, power, or
involvement of the company in respect to the controversy, or its
public efforts to influence the results of such controversy—were such
109
as to merit public figure treatment.”
2.

Vegod Corporation v. American Broadcasting Companies

Vegod Corporation closes out stores that are going out of
110
business.
It ran a closing out sale for an old, well-known, and
111
ABC broadcasted a story in which a
respected department store.
Better Business Bureau spokesman criticized the quality of goods
112
sold at the closeout. Vegod sued for defamation, and ABC claimed
that Vegod was a public figure and thus required to prove actual
113
malice.
The California Supreme Court found that while the quality of
goods for sale was a matter of public interest, “criticism of
commercial conduct does not deserve the special protection of the
114
actual malice test.”
Therefore, “a person in the business world
advertising his wares does not necessarily become part of an existing
115
public controversy.”
3.

Gilbert v. Sykes

Dr. Sykes is a prominent professor and practitioner of plastic and
reconstructive surgery at a prestigious medical institution in
116
Sacramento, California.
Sykes has written numerous articles on
plastic surgery, appeared in local television shows on the subject and
117
Top Doctors, a
advertised in the Sacramento media market.
Sacramento magazine, credited him as “a nationally recognized
educator and leader in minimally invasive esthetic and laser surgery
[,] [who] has performed over 10,000 surgical procedures, is board-

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 591.
Id.
Vegod Corp. v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 25 Cal. 3d 763, 765 (1979).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 766.
Id. at 770.
Id.
Gilbert v. Sykes, 147 Cal. App. 4th 13, 17, 23 (2007).
Id. at 23.
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certified in otolaryngology and facial plastic surgery, and has
118
published three books and over 90 articles on facial plastic surgery.”
After Sykes performed a series of cosmetic facial procedures on
Georgette Gilbert, she sued him for malpractice and posted negative
reviews about her experience on a website she created, entitled
119
www.mysurgerynightmare.com.
On this website, Gilbert included
before and after photographs, and wrote “I was told by my doctor
that this was a good result—that I looked better after his surgery—
120
She also said that Sykes told her that she
what do you think?”
would look natural after the surgery and that she was under the
impression the change would be subtle, but that the “surgery was the
121
biggest regret of [her] life.”
Sykes cross-complained against Gilbert for defamation. He
claimed that the photographs on the website were misleading,
because the “after” photographs were taken after significant
122
additional cosmetic surgery procedures performed by someone else.
Furthermore, Sykes claimed that the website falsely indicated that he
performed procedures that Gilbert did not need or want, misstated
the content of their communications, and falsely suggested that he
123
was compensated for the procedures “under the table.”
The trial court found that Sykes was a limited-purpose public
124
figure. Thus, to prevail on a defamation claim, Sykes was required
to prove not only that Gilbert’s claims were false, but that they were
125
uttered with actual malice.
In determining whether Sykes was a public figure, the court stated
that “first, there must be a public controversy, which means the issue
was debated publicly and had foreseeable and substantial
ramifications for nonparticipants. Second, the plaintiff must have
undertaken some voluntary act through which he or she sought to
126
The court found that
influence resolution of the public issue.”
“plastic surgery is a subject of widespread public interest and

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 18–19.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 24.
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discussion.” The court then held that Sykes thrust himself into that
debate by: (1) appearing on local television shows, (2) writing
numerous articles in medical journals and beauty magazines on the
subject, (3) testifying as an expert witness in the field of plastic
128
surgery, and (4) advertising his services in the local media.
B. Problems and Ambiguities in the Public Figure Doctrine as Applied to
Businesses for the Purpose of Online Business Reviews

The current public versus private figure distinction was developed
for individuals, particularly those who are actively involved in
political debates. Remember, for example, the case of Associated
Press v. Walker, where an activist made a career opposing physical
intervention by federal marshals into political activity, thus becoming
a public figure for the purposes of an article about federal military
129
However, the two main factors that courts
intervention in a riot.
have considered in distinguishing between public and private figures,
injection into a public debate and access to media, are not necessarily
applicable to businesses.
First, the “injection into public debate” or “intimate involvement
in the resolution of public affairs” formulation is difficult to apply to
businesses. For Dr. Sykes, it was fairly simple, since plastic surgery is
more controversial than most business activities, and he did far more
than most businesses or practitioners to inject himself into that debate
by writing articles, appearing on television, testifying in trials, and
advertising aggressively. However, with typical businesses, it is
difficult to identify a particular public controversy into which the
business has injected itself. This is true even of businesses that are
almost certainly public figures. For example, while Apple may not
necessarily have injected itself into any particular debate, the
company’s notoriety would almost certainly seem to make it a limited
purpose public figure for the purposes of its products, if not a general
purpose public figure.
One potential counterargument is the one rejected by Bruno &
Stillman and Vegod Corporation—that the quality of services or
products is always a public controversy into which businesses inject
themselves by offering and advertising those services or products.
127. Id. at 23 (noting that “Elective cosmetic surgery was the subject of the popular
television series Extreme Makeover, in which it is portrayed as a positive, life-transforming
event. Yet the widespread and indiscriminate use of plastic surgery by celebrities and the
public has also generated a firestorm of negative publicity and comment.”).
128. Id. at 25.
129. Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 140 (1967).
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However, this is a strained adaptation of the rule. Whereas the
quality of goods and services may be a matter of public concern, it is
not likely a public “controversy.”
Regardless, both the stringent requirement of active injection into
a public debate and the media/non-media distinction are inapposite in
the case of businesses. First, businesses don’t have the same privacy
rights as private citizens, which is the primary purpose of the public
130
controversy requirement. Second, businesses have access to online
forums and can rebut assertions, which is the core purpose of the
131
media/non-media distinction. Third, online reviews have the ability
132
to reach a mass audience like traditional forms of media.

V. A Proposed Line Based on Advertising
A. Competing Constitutional Considerations

In creating a more workable public figure standard for businesses
in the context of online reviews, there appears to be four competing
constitutional considerations. First, there is the right of consumers to
133
Second, there is the right of
receive truthful information.
134
135
individuals to share their opinion, and to do so anonymously.
136
Third, there is the right of businesses to protect their reputation.
Finally, there is the concern that businesses will use their resources to
137
chill harmful protected speech.

130. Wilson, supra note 25, at 560.
131. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (however, the court noted that “an
opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo harm of defamatory falsehood”).
132. Wilson, supra note 25, at 560.
133. This is at the heart of the commercial speech doctrine. See Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (noting that for this reason,
“[t]he Constitution therefore affords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to
other constitutionally guaranteed expression . . . . The government may ban forms of
communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it” (citations omitted)).
134. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339 (“However pernicious an opinion may seem, we
depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition
of other ideas.”).
135. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 846 (1997) (finding that the CDA’s “indecent
transmission” and “patently offensive display” provisions violated the First Amendment).
136. Businesses, like individuals, have a right not to be defamed. This is the core of
defamation law.
137. See, e.g., state anti-SLAPP statutes (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation). For example, in 1992 the California legislature enacted an anti-SLAPP
statute “which provided broad authority to strike a complaint based on an act of free
speech ‘in connection with a public issue’ unless the court determined the plaintiff had
established, by credible evidence, ‘a probability [that it would] prevail on the claim.’”
Wilson, supra note 25, at 572.
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Different scenarios present different constitutional problems. For
example, where a malicious reviewer defames a small mom and pop
store that relies on positive Yelp reviews, there is a concern that the
business will not be able to adequately protect its reputation.
However, there is little risk that the store will use its resources to chill
protected speech. Conversely, where a well-meaning individual
writes a negative review about service received by a large
corporation, there is a concern that the corporation will threaten
litigation to bully the reviewer into retracting the speech, thus
infringing on the First Amendment rights of the reviewer.
B. Settlement: A Practical Consideration

In creating a more workable public versus private figure standard,
it is also important to consider the impact that it may have on the
settlement of future defamation actions. Because online business
reviews are often not a matter on which parties want to spend large
amounts of money litigating, defamation actions for these reviews
often settle. The benefit of settlement is that it prevents these cases
from congesting court dockets. The downside is that in a settlement,
a business often has more power than a reviewer, and is more likely
to bully a reviewer into retracting protected speech. The clearer the
standard, the more likely that claims will be resolved on the
pleadings, and the less likely that settlement of weak claims will
occur.
C. A Workable Balance: The Two Options

In creating any standard, courts are often faced with the choice
between drawing a bright line rule or imposing a multi-factor
retroactive balancing test. Defining the public figure standard as it
applies to online business reviews is no different. On one hand,
courts could decide that either all businesses are public figures for the
purposes of online business reviews. On the other, courts could
decide that only some businesses are properly labeled as public
figures whereas others are private figures, and attempt to draw a line
distinguishing the two. Below, this Note will analyze the downsides
and benefits of each, and propose somewhat of a hybrid—a balancing
test based on advertising.
1.

Bright Line Rule

Under this option, the quality of available goods and services
would be treated as a public controversy, and all businesses that offer
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goods and services would be seen as thrusting themselves into that
controversy.
There are three main benefits to this approach. First, it is a
simple and clear standard. It would produce a chain of positive
results. With a clear standard, judges could more easily dismiss nonmeritorious cases on the pleadings. As a result, cases involving
protected speech are less likely to settle. Therefore, protected speech
is less likely to be silenced. Second, finding that all businesses are
public figures would prevent reviewers from being liable for negligent
misstatements of fact. If viewers are concerned that they will be
liable for negligent misstatements of fact, they are less likely to review
businesses at all. If they do review businesses, they are more likely to
refrain from sharing their entire experience. Thus, this standard
would encourage honest and more frequent reviews. Finally, the
higher burden would protect more speech on the border of opinion
and fact.
The adoption of a bright line rule would further three of the four
competing constitutional considerations: the right of consumers to
receive truthful information, the right of individuals to state their
opinion anonymously, and the concern that corporations will chill
speech by bullying individual reviewers. However, it does little to
protect the right of businesses to protect their reputation in the face
of defamatory remarks. The actual malice standard would make it
nearly impossible for the mom and pop store to recover for
defamation, even in the face of a debilitating misstatement of fact.
2.

Retroactive Balancing Test

Under this option, courts would continue to use some sort of test
to distinguish between businesses that are public figures, and
businesses that are private figures.
There are two main benefits to this approach. First, it arguably
more fairly distinguishes between different types of businesses (the
large corporation and the mom and pop store, for example). Second,
it makes recovery possible for smaller local businesses who may be
materially harmed by defamatory reviews. Depending on where the
line was drawn and how effectively this line protected truthful speech,
a balancing test could adequately protect both the rights of businesses
to guard their reputations against defamatory speech, and the right of
individuals to share their opinions.
However, like with any retroactive balancing test, there are
downsides to this approach. It is difficult for courts to distinguish
between businesses that are public and private figures, and to create a
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line that accurately depicts that difference. For example, even if it
were admitted that large corporations are public figures, and mom
and pop stores are not, this still leaves many businesses of varying
size, notoriety, wealth, and many other factors in the middle.
The likely result, as with the current test, is that parties will not
know whether a business is a public figure until the matter is litigated.
This wastes both time and money, and makes it more likely that cases
will settle, since individual reviewers are unwilling to risk the time
and money required to litigate when they can merely retract the
contested statement. Therefore, this approach can increase the
possibility that businesses will chill speech by bullying reviewers.
3.

Compromise: A Simple Rule Based on Advertising

The ideal test would provide a clear and fair distinction between
public and private figure businesses. As a result, small private
businesses would not be precluded from recovering for truly harmful
and defamatory speech, while reviewers would not be bullied into
removing truthful or opinion speech about businesses that are public
figures.
This would first require abandoning the existing formulation,
which is geared towards individuals and political involvement, and
does not accurately or efficiently delineate those businesses that seem
like they should be public figures. Then, it requires finding a simple
distinction between public and private figure businesses. Although
there are many other factors about a business that a court could
potentially take into consideration, an overly complicated and
arbitrary test would still result in increased settlement, and thus an
increased risk that protected speech would be removed.
This proposed compromise is a test based on online advertising.
Where businesses advertise online, they inject themselves into the
online discourse about their products and services, thereby inviting
criticism. This is reminiscent of the “thrust into a public controversy”
test, as advertising can be seen as a way that businesses thrust
themselves into the public discourse about a particular product.
However, drawing a clear line based on online advertising prevents
courts from having to individually determine whether a public
controversy exists, and whether a business has injected itself into that
controversy.
This test also establishes a clear enough standard where nonmeritorious cases brought merely to silence speech could be resolved
on the pleadings before reviewers agreed to retract protected speech.
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Finally, this test gives businesses a choice. If a business wants to
enter the quality of its products and services into the public discourse,
it can advertise them online. But in doing so, the business assumes
the risk that consumers will not like its products and will either voice
negative opinions, or make negligent misstatements of fact, for which
the business would have no remedy. Conversely, if a business wants
to remain private, it can choose not to advertise online, thereby
refusing to invite any online criticism.
Targeting online advertising in particular, as opposed to all
advertising, serves two main purposes. First, it protects businesses
that are not online and thus unable to respond to online reviews.
Second, it prevents mom and pop businesses, whose only advertising
is perhaps a coupon or an ad in a local paper, from being bullied by
negative reviews.
Although clarity is a valuable aspect of this test, there should
probably be an exception for de minimus online advertising where it
is clear that a business’s presence online is minimal, and that the
business is not a member of the online community such that it should
be able to respond to negative reviews. For example, if a mom and
pop store pays the local newspaper to post an advertisement, which
appears in the online version of the paper, this may not be a sufficient
online presence to trigger this public figure test.

VI. Conclusion
Modern consumers look to online business review sites to guide
their selection of goods and services. As a result, online business
reviews are becoming increasingly important in defining a business’s
reputation. When a business identifies a false consumer review, its
remedy is to file a defamation suit. However, the defamation
standard today is unclear insofar as it applies to businesses. If a
business is a public figure, then it must show that a review was written
with actual malice (reckless disregard for the truth or knowledge of
falsity) before it can recover for defamation. If, however, a business
is a private figure, the level of fault that it must prove is lower.
The current public figure test looks to whether the business has
thrust itself into a public controversy, and whether it has access to
media. However, this standard was developed for individuals and
seems inapposite when evaluating businesses. Furthermore, the
“access to media” aspect may no longer be relevant, given the vast
availability of the internet.
As a result of these ambiguities, public figure status is somewhat
arbitrary, and must be decided on a case-by-case basis. This results in
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an increase in the number of cases that settle, because reviewers are
unwilling to spend the time or money to litigate these issues, and
would prefer to retract contested posts. However, this means that
sometimes, protected speech is silenced for the sake of expediency.
This Note proposes a different test more tailored to businesses.
Under this test, businesses who choose to advertise their goods and
services online voluntarily invite comment and criticism about the
quality of those goods and services. Therefore, they become public
figures for the purposes of online business reviews. Conversely,
businesses that do not advertise themselves online retain private
figure status and do not have to meet the heightened standard of
actual malice. The simplicity of this test allows for dismissal on the
pleadings in non-meritorious cases, thus preventing businesses from
bullying individuals from removing protected reviews.

